Chapter 13 - Verse 2

Do thou also know the Kṣetrajña, described above, to be Myself, to be the Supreme Lord, not a being of the world (samsara). The meaning is this :—The Kṣetrajña who is in all Kṣetras, and who is differentiated by the manifold upadhis or Kṣetras, from Brahma down to a clump of grass, is, you should understand, really devoid of all the various upadhis (conditions) and is inaccessible to any such word or thought as ‘sat’ or ‘asat,’ existent or non-existent. As nothing else remains to be known apart from the true nature of Kṣetra, Kṣetrajña and the Īśvara, that knowledge by which the two objects of knowledge, Kṣetra and Kṣetrajña, are known is considered by Me—the Lord, Viṣṇu—to be the right knowledge.

The soul is subject to evil only through ignorance.

(Objection) :—If only one Being, namely, Īśvara, exists in all Kṣetras, if there exists no being, no other enjoyer, distinct from Him, it would follow either that the Īśvara is a samsarin; or that there is no samsara because there is no samsarin—none else apart from the Īśvara. Neither conclusion is acceptable; for, then, it would follow that the scriptures which treat of bondage and liberation and their respective causes would have no purpose to serve. Moreover, the conclusion is opposed to all evidence, including sensuous perception (pratyaksha). In the first place, pleasure and pain and their causes, which together constitute the samsara, are known to us by immediate perception. And from our perception of variety in the world may also be inferred the existence of samsara arising from dharma and a-dharma. All this would be inexplicable if the Atman and the Īśvara, the Self and the Lord, be identical.

(Answer):—No; for, that can be explained as due to a distinction between jnana and ajnana, between knowledge and ignorance. It has been said:

“These, what is known as wisdom and what is known as unwisdom, are quite distinct and lead to different goals.”—(Katha-Up. ii. 4.)

And so also a distinction through effect between vidya and avidya, wisdom and unwisdom, as producing quite opposite results,—the right and the sweet,—is pointed out (in the same Upaniṣad and in the same context), wisdom leading to the right, while the sweet is the effect of unwisdom. Accordingly, Vyāsa says:

‘Then there are these two paths, etc.,—(Mokshadharma. 24-6.)

‘There are only these two paths,’ &c.

Here (in the Gītā) also two paths have been spoken of. Now we learn from the sruti, smriti and reasoning, that unwisdom with its effect should be got rid of. As to the sruti, the following passages may be quoted :

“If in this world a person knows (the Self), then the true end is gained; if a person in this world does not know (the Self), then there will be a great calamity.”—(Kena-Upaniṣad, 2-5.)

‘He who knows Him (the Supreme Self) thus becomes immortal here; there is no other way to reach the Goal.’—(Puruṣa-sukta.)

‘The wise man is afraid of nothing’—(Taittiriya-Upaniṣad 2-4.)

As regards the ignorant person :—

‘But to him there is the fear (of samsara).’—(Ibid. 2-7.)

‘Those who live in the midst of avidya or ignorance ……go round and with an erring step, deluded as blind people led by the blind!’—(Katha-Upaniṣad, 2-5).

‘He who knows Brahman is Brahman Itself.’—(Mundaka-Up. 3-2-9.)

“Whoever worships another Deity, thinking, ‘He is another, another am I,’ he does not know; for, he is like a beast for the Gods.”—(Brihadaranyaka-Up. 1-4-10).

As to him who knows the Self,

‘He becomes all this.’—(Ibid. 1-4-10).

“When men can roll up the sky like leather, (then only, not till then) can the end of sorrow be, without men knowing God.” (Sveta. Up. 6-20).

And passages from the smriti—the Bhagavad-Gītā v. 15, 19, and xiii. 28,—may also be quoted. By reasoning (nyaya) also we come to the same conclusion. It is said :

‘Men avoid by knowledge serpents, thorns and wells; by ignorance some fall into them; see how estimable is the effect of knowledge.’—(Mokṣadharma, 201-16).

So also* we see that an ignorant man regards the physical body, etc., as the Self, is impelled by attachment and hatred and the like, performs righteous and unrighteous deeds (Dharma and A-dharma), and is born and dead, while those are liberated who, knowing the Self to be distinct from the body and the like, give up attachment and hatred, and no longer engage in righteous or unrighteous deeds to which those passions may lead. This nobody can deny by argument.

Here follows the nyaya or reasoning above referred to.—(A).

Such * being the case, the Kṣetrajña, who is the Īśvara Himself, appears to be a samsarin owing to a distinction in the upadhis set up by avidya, in the same way that the Atman or individual Self appears (by avidya) to be identical with the physical body, etc. It is a well-ascertained truth that that notion of identity of the individual Self with the not-Self,—with the physical body and the like,—which is common to all mortal creatures is caused by avidya, just as a pillar (in darkness) is mistaken (through avidya) for a human being. But thereby no essential quality of the man is actually transferred to the pillar, nor is any essential quality of the pillar actually transferred to the man. Similarly; consciousness never actually pertains to the body; neither can it be that any attributes of the body—such as pleasure, pain and dulness—actually pertain to Consciousness, to the Self; for, like decay and death, such attributes are ascribed to the Self through avidya.

Knowledge and ignorance being, as shewn above, distinct in kind and in effect. the Supreme Being and the individual Self must be essentially identical, though, through the upadhis such as Buddhi, the Self appears to be a samsarin—an illusion set up by avidya.—(A).

Kshetra is really unaffected by samsara.

(Objection):—No, the two cases are dissimilar. The pillar and the man are both objects of cognition (i.e., external to the Self) and are as such mistaken one for the other by the cogniser through avidya, whereas you say that the body and the Self, which are respectively the cognised and the cogniser, are mistaken one for the other. Thus the illustration differs from what has to be illustrated. Wherefore† the attribute of the body, though an object of cognition, actually pertains to the Self, the cogniser.

The identifying of the Self with the body being no mere illusion (bhrama).

(Answer):—No; for, then the Self would also become unconscious, etc. If the attributes—such as pleasure, pain, delusion, desire, hatred—of the body, etc. i.e., of Kṣetra (Matter) which is an object of cognition, could ever pertain to the Self, the cognizer, then it would be necessary to state a reason for the difference,—i.e., to explain why a few attributes only of Kṣetra (an object of cognition) which are ascribed to the Self by avidya actually pertain to the Self, while others such as decay and death do not. On the other hand, we are led to infer that those qualities of Kṣetra do not actually pertain to the Self, because, like decay and death, they also are attributed to the Self, by avidya; also because they are objects shunned or sought for, and so on. Such being the case, inasmuch as samsara which consists in doing and enjoying, and which has its root in the cognized, is only attributed to the cognizer by avidya,—the cognizer is not thereby affected, just as the akasa or ether is not affected by the attributes of dirtiness and concavity which are ascribed to it by children through ignorance.

Thus, it cannot be imagined that the Kṣetrajña, the Lord, though existing in all Kṣetras, can ever so much as smell of the nature of a samsarin. Nowhere in our experience have we found anything improved or spoiled by a quality being falsely attributed to it through avidya.

As to the contention that the illustration is not quite analogous, we reply that it is wrong to say so.—Why?—For the intended point of agreement between the illustration and the thing illustrated consists in something being falsely attributed through ignorance. In this respect, both agree. But as to the contention that no false attribution of the qualities of the object to the subject is ever experienced, it has been shewn that even the contention fails in the case of decay and death.

Avidya inheres in the organ, not in the Self.

(Objection):—As possessed of avidya, Kṣetrajña is a samsarin.

(Answer):—No; for avidya is born of Tamas. As partaking of the nature of a veil, avidya—whether causing perception of what is quite the contrary of truth, or causing doubt, or causing nescience or non-perception of a truth—is a Tamasic notion, i.e., a notion born of Tamas; for, on the dawn of the light of discrimination, it disappears; and (for instance) we find the same three modes of avidya—such as non-perception, etc.,—arising also from timira (an eye-disease causing dimness of sight), which is Tamasic, as partaking of the nature of a veil.*

That is to say, the three forms or avidya are due to a certain disorder, and are not therefore attributes of the Self—(A).

(Objection):—The avidya is an inherent property (dharma) of the cogniser.

(Answer) :—No; for, we see that it is the organ of sight that is affected with the disease of timira.

(To explain) :—You (the opponent) say: Avidyā is an inherent property of the cogniser. As possessed of this avidya, Kṣetrajña is a samsarin. It is therefore unjust to say that Kṣetrajña is the Īśvara Himself and not a samsarin.

We reply : It is not right to say so; for, we see that such diseases as lead to the perception of what is contrary to truth, and so on, pertain to the eye, to the organ. Neither the perception of what is contrary to truth, nor the cause thereof (viz., the disease of timira), pertains to the percipient; for, when timira is removed by the treatment of the eye, the percipient is no longer subject to such perception, which is therefore not a property of the percipient. Similarly, non-perception, false perception, and doubt, as well as their cause, properly pertain to the instrument, to one or another sense-organ, but not to the Kṣetrajña, the cogniser. Moreover, they are all objects of cognition and cannot therefore form the properties of the cogniser, any more than the light of a lamp. And because they are cognisable, it follows also that they can be cognised only through some organ which is distinct from the cogniser; and no philosopher admits that, in the state of liberation wherein all the sense-organs are absent, there is any such evil as avidya. If they (false preception, etc.) were essential properties of the Self, the Kṣetrajña, as the heat is an essential property of fire, there could be no getting rid of them at any time; and it is impossible for the immutable and formless Self, all-pervading like the akasa, to unite or part with any thing whatsoever. Wherefore we conclude that the Kṣetrajña is ever identical with Īśvara. The Lord also says, “Being beginningless and without qualities.”* (xiii. 31).

The Lord teaches here that the Self is devoid of attributes.—(A).

Scriptural injunctions apply only to the state of bondage.

(Objection):—Then, in the absence of samsara and samsarins, the conclusion is inevitable that the sastra or scripture serves no purpose, and so on.

(Answer)—No; for, it is admitted by all. The burden of explaining an objectionable point admitted into their systems by all those philosophers who argue the existence of Atman does not lie on only one of them.—In what way do all classes of philosophers admit into their systems this objectionable point?—All philosophers who admit the existence of a Self agree that liberated Selfs are not conscious of samsara or of the state of being bound to samsara; still, it is not believed that their systems are open to the objection that the sastra serves no purpose. So, according to our view, when the Kṣetrajñas become one with the Lord, then let the sastra serve no purpose. It has, however, a purpose to serve where there is avidya. Just as, with the dualists (dvaitins) of all classes, the sastra has a purpose to serve only in the state of bondage but not in the state of liberation, so with us also.

Bondage and liberation are not real states of the Self.

Objection :—All dualistic philosophers (Dvaitins) hold that states of bondage and liberation are real conditions of the Self, real in the literal sense of the terms. Since thus there really exist something to be avoided and something attained, as also the means thereto, the sastra has some purpose to serve. But in the case of the non-dualists (Advaitins), the dual world is unreal; and as the bondage of the self is caused by avidya, it is also unreal. Thus the sastra would have no subject to treat of and would therefore serve no purpose.

(Answer) :—No; for, the Self cannot (really) exist in different states.—If bondage and liberation be states of the Self, they must be either simultaneous or successive. They cannot be simultaneous states of the Self as they are mutually opposed, just as motion and rest cannot be simultaneous states of one and the same thing. If successive, they are either caused or uncaused by another. If uncaused by another, there can be no liberation. If caused by another, they cannot be inherent in the Self and cannot therefore be real. And this is opposed to the hypothesis*. Moreover, if we would determine the order of their occurrence, the state of bondage should come first, without a beginning, but having an end; and this is opposed to all evidence, Similarly, it has to be admitted that the state of liberation has a beginning and has no end; which is alike opposed to all evidence. Nor is it possible to maintain the eternality of that which passes from one state to another.

That the states of bondage and liberation are real conditions of the Self.

Now, if, in order to avoid the objection of non-eternality, it be held that the states of bondage and liberation do not pertain to the Self, then even the dualists cannot avoid the objection that the sastra has no purpose to serve. The dualists and the non-dualists being thus similarly situated, the burden of answering the objection does not lie on the non-dualists alone.

Scriptural injunctions concern the unenlightened.

In point of fact, the objection that the sastra would have no purpose to serve cannot be brought against non-dualism; for, the sastra is concerned with the ignorant who view things as they present themselves to their consciousness.—It is, indeed, the ignorant who identify themselves with the cause and the effect, * with the not-Self. But not the wise; for, these latter do not identify themselves with the cause and the effect, since they know that the Self is distinct from the cause and the effect. Not even the dullest or the most insane person regards water and fire, or light and darkness, as indentical; how much less a wise man. Wherefore, the injunctions and prohibitions of the sastra do not apply to him who knows the Self to be distinct from the cause and the effect. Of course, when a certain person has been commanded to do an action in the words “Do this, O Devadatta,” no other person, such as Viṣṇu-mitra, though standing near and hearing the word of command, thinks that he (Viṣṇu-mitra) has been so ordered; he might, however, think so if he did not understand to whom the injunction has been addressed. So, too, in the case of the cause and the effect here.

The cause is agency and the effect is enjoyment; or the cause is karma, adrishta, and the effect is the body to which karma has given rise.—(A.)

(Objection) :— Notwithstanding his knowledge that the Self is unconnected with the cause and the effect, it is quite possible for a wise man to regard himself—in reference to the connection (between the Self and the body, etc.,) once set up by avidya (prakriti)—as still bound by the injunctions of the sastra, thinking that he has been enjoined to adopt a certain course of action by which to attain a desirable end, and to avoid a certain other course of action which leads to an evil; just as a father and his sons * regard every one among themselves as bound by the injunctions and prohibitions addressed to every other, notwithstanding their knowledge that they are all persons distinct from each other.

Vide Briha. Up. 1-5-17.

(Answer) :—No; it is only prior to the knowledge of the Self unconnected with causes and effects that it is possible for one to identify the Self with them; for, it is only after having duly observed the injunctions and prohibitions of the sastra—but not before †—that a person attains to the knowledge that the Self is quite unconnected with causes and effects. Hence the conclusion that the injunctions and prohibitions of the sastra concern only the ignorant.

Vide Vedanta-Sutras.III. iv 26-27.

(Objection) :—Neither those who know that the Self is independent of the body, etc., nor those who regard the mere body as the Self are, (according to non-dualists), concerned with the injunctions such as “He who desires svarga must sacrifice,” “Let none eat kalanja”; thus, there being no person who would observe scriptural injunctions, the sastra would have no purpose to serve.

(Answer) :—Performance of enjoined acts and abstention from prohibited acts are possible in the case of those who know of the Self only through the Scriptures.—He who knows Brahman and has realised the identity of the Kṣetra-jna with the Lord does not certainly engage in the Vidic rites. Neither does the person who denies the existence of the Self and of the other world engage in such rites. But, he who derives his idea of the Self only from the scriptural injunctions,—i.e., who believes in the existence of the Self* because the teaching of the sastra enjoining certain actions and prohibiting (certain others) would otherwise be inexplicable, but who does not directly know the Self in His essential nature,—cherishes a longing for the results of the Vedic rites and devoutly performs them : a fact which is evident to us all. Wherefore, it cannot be said that the sastra would have no purpose to serve.

Knowing nothing more than that the Self exists and survives the body; this conviction being formed on the basis of the teaching of the Karma-kanda.

(Objection) :—On seeing the wise not performing Vedic rites, their followers also may not perform them; and thus the sastra would serve no purpose at all.

(Answer) :—No; for very rare is the person who attains wisdom. It is, indeed, only one among many that attains wisdom. As we now see. Nor do the ignorant follow the wise men; for, attachment and other evil passions necessarily lead to action. We do see people engaging in the practice of Black Magic. † Lastly, action is natural to man, as has been said already, “It is nature that acts.” (v. 14).

This fact shews that the ignorant do not always follow the wise men. In spite of protests of wise men, we find some ignorant men resorting to Sorcery or Black Magic.

Therefore, samsara is only based on avidya and exists only for the ignorant man who sees the world as it appears to him. Neither avidya nor its effect pertains to Kṣetrajña pure and simple. Nor is illusory knowledge able to affect the

Real Thing. The water of the mirage, for instance, can by no means render the saline soil miry with moisture. So, too, avidya can do nothing to Kṣetrajña. Wherefore it has been said, ‘Do thou also know Me as Kṣetrajña’ (xiii. 2); and ‘By unwisdom wisdom is covered’ (v. 15).

Learned but deluded.

(Objection):—How is it that the learned (pandits) also feel—“I am so and so*,” “this† is mine,”—like the samsarins?

Referring to superior birth, etc.

Referring to wife, children, etc.

(Answer):—Listen. Their learning consists in regarding the body itself as their Self! ‡

That is to say, those who hold this belief are not pandits in the proper sense of the term. We do admit the existence of such a belief; only we regard it as pratibhasika, as due to illusion, while, in point of absolute truth, the Self is unaffected by samsara.

If, on the other hand, they really see the immutable Kṣetrajña, they would desire neither pleasure nor action with the attachment ’let it be mine’; for, pleasure and action are but changes of state.

Thus, then, it is the ignorant man who, longing for results, engages in action. The wise man, on the contrary, who sees the immutable Self, cherishes no longing for results and does not therefore engage in action; and when, as a consequence, the activity of the aggregate—of the body and the senses—ceases, we say, only figuratively, that he abstains from action.

There is, again, another sort of learning professed by some other (class of panndits), which may be stated as follows—The Lord Himself is Kṣetrajña, and Kṣetra is quite distinct from Kṣetrajña who perceives it; but I am a samsarin subject to pleasure and pain. To bring about the cessation of samsara I should first acquire a discriminative knowledge of Kṣetra and Kṣetrajña then attain a direct perception of the Kṣetrajña, the Lord, by means of dhyana or meditation of the Lord, and then dwell in the true nature of the Lord.* He who is given to know thus and he who teaches thus †, neither of them is the Kṣetrajña.

The individual Ego is distinct from the Lord, and should strive to attain to the state of Isvara by means of the knowledge which can be brought about through dhyana.—(D).

i.e., The pupil and the Teacher—(A.)

He who holds this view and hopes to make out that the sastra concerning bondage and liberation has a meaning is the meanest of the learned. He is the slayer of the Self. Ignorant in himself, he confounds others, devoid as he is of the traditional key (sampradaya) to the teaching of the sastras. Ignoring what is directly taught ‡, he suggests what is not taught. Therefore, not being acquainted with the traditional interpretation, he is to be neglected as an ignorant man, though learned in all sastras.

In such passages as “That Thou art” “This Self is Brahman,”—(Mandukya—Up.)

The relation of the Self to samsara is a mere illusion

Now as to the objections that Īśvara would be a samsarin if He be one with Kṣetrajña, and that if Kṣetrajñas be one with the Īśvara there can be no samsara because there is no samsarin: these objections have been met by saying that knowledge and ignorance are distinct in kind and in effects, as admitted by all.§—To explain: The Real Entity (viz., Īśvara) is not affected by the defect (samsara) attributed to Him through ignorance of that Real Entity. This has also been illustrated by the fact that the water of the mirage does not wet the saline soil. And the objection raised on the ground that in the absence of a samsarin there can be no samsara has been answered by explaining that the samsara and the samsarin are creatures of avidya.

That is to say, by saying that the Lord and the soul are one in reality, while illusion makes Kshetrajna a samsarin—(A).

(Objection) :—The very fact that Kṣetrajña is possessed of avidya makes Him a samsarin; and the effect thereof—happiness and misery and so on—is directly perceived.

(Answer) :—No; for, what is perceived is an attribute of Kṣetra (matter); and Kṣetrajña, the cogniser, cannot be vitiated by the blemish due to it. To explain: whatever, blemish—not inhering in Kṣetrajña—you ascribe to Him, it comes under the cognised, and therefore forms a property of Kṣetra, and not a property of Kṣetrajña. Nor is Kṣetrajña affected by it, since such intimate association of the cogniser and the cognised is impossible. If there should be such an association, then that blemish could not be cognised. That is to say, if misery and nescience were properties of the Self, how could they be objects of immediate perception *? Or, how could they ever be regarded as the properties of the Self? † Since it has been determined that all that is knowable is Kṣetra (xiii. 5-6), and that Kṣetrajña is the knower and none else (xiii. 1). it is nothing but sheer ignorance which may lead one to contradict it by saying that nescience and misery and the like are the attributes and specific properties of Kṣetrajña and that they are immediately perceived as such.

If the Self could perceive His own properties, He could also perceive Himself; which is absurd, since one and the same thing cannot be both the agent and the object of an action.

Whatever is perceived, as for instance form and colour, cannot be a property of the perceiver.

The perception of the relation of avidya, etc., to the Self is due to illusion.

* Now asks (the opponent) :—Whose is this avidya?

In the following discussion, the opponent tries to drive the Advaitin to the conclusion that the Kshetrajna is tainted with Avidya and cannot therefore be identical with the Isvara, while the Advaitin avoids it by shewing that the Kshetrajna can really have no connection whatever with Avidya which, cognised as it is by Him, is always distinct from him.

[To explain :—This avidya which accounts for the mistaken notion is not an independent entity and should inhere in something else which has an independent existence. But it cannot inhere in Cit or Consciousness which is vidya by nature, and there is no independent entity outside Cit. Hence the question.—(A).]

(Reply) :—By whomsoever it is seen.

[To explain: Do you ask to know whether avidya inheres as an attribute in something else which is an independent entity, or to know in particular what that entity is wherein it inheres? In the first case, there is no occasion for the question at all, for, if avidya be cognised, then, since it cannot exist by itself, it must be cognised as inhering in something else. If, on the other hand, avidya be not cognised, then how do you know that avidya exists at all?

The opponent perhaps means to ask what that entity is wherein avidya inheres. Hence the question that follows. (A).]

(Opponent) :—By whom is it seen?

(Reply)—As regards this we say: There is no use asking the question. “By whom is avidya seen?” For, if avidya is perceived, you perceive also the one who has that avidya. When its possessor is perceived, it is not proper to ask, “Whose is it?” When the possessor of cows is seen, there is no occasion for the question “whose are the cows?”

[To explain : Since avidya is an object of cognition, and since the Self wherein it inheres reveals Himself in one’s own consciousness—there is no occasion for the question.—(A)].

(Opponent) :—The illustration is not analogous to the case in point. Since the cows and their possessor are objects of immediate perception, their relation is also on object of immediate perception; and so the question has no meaning. But not so are avidya and its possessor both object of immediate perception. If they were, the question ld have been meaningless.

(Reply) :—If you know to what particular entity, not immediately perceived, avidya is related, of what avail is it to you?

[The meaning is :—Though the possessor of avidya is not immediately perceived, still, you know in what entity avidya inheres. Where is then any occasion for your question?]

The opponent does not understand the real drift of the reply and proceeds as follows :—(A)]

(Opponent) :—Since avidya is the cause of evil. it is a thing that should he got rid of. [So, I ask to know whose is avidya.—(B)].

(Reply) :—He who has avidya will get rid of it, [and it can be no other—(A).]

(Opponent) :—Why, it is I who have avidya, and I should try and get rid of it—(A.)]:

(Reply) :—Then you know avidya and the Self, its possessor, [so that your question has no meaning—(A)].

(Opponent) :—I know, but not by immediate perception. [Hence my question—(A)]:

(Reply) :—Then you know the Self by inference.* How can you perceive the relation between the Self and avidya? It is not indeed possible for you to perceive your Self as related to avidya, at the same moment (that your Self cognises avidya); for, the cogniser (Self) acts at the moment as the percipient of avidya.‡ Neither can there be a (separate) cogniser of the relation between the cogniser (the Self) and avidya, nor a separate cognition of that (relation); for then you would commit the fallacy of infinite regress (anavastha). — If the relation between the cogniser (the Self) and the cognised could be cognised, another cogniser should be supposed to exist; then another cogniser of that cogniser; then another of that again; and so on; and thus the series would necessarily be endless. If, on the other hand, avidya —or, for that matter, anything else—is the cognised, then it is ever the cognised only. So also the cogniser is ever the cogniser; he can never become the cognised. Such being the case, † Kṣetrajña, the cogniser, is not at all tainted by nescience, misery and the like.

The inference meant here may be stated as follows :—I must be the possessor of avidya, because I feel the effects of avidya such as misery. If I have no avidya, I should not feel its effects; for those who have no avidya, as for instance the liberated souls, do not feel the effects of avidya—(A).

The Self cannot be both the perceiver and the perceived at the same time.—(A).

Because the Self cannot be cognised by anything beyond, there is on proof whatever that avidya inheres in the Self. And the Self reveals himslef in every phase of consciousness.—(A).

(Objection) :—There is in the Self this blemish, viz., that He is the cogniser of Kṣetra or matter which is full of blemishes.

(Answer) :—No; for, it is only by a figure of speech that the Self, the immutable Consciousness, is spoken of as the cogniser, just as, in virtue of its heat, fire is said, by a figure, to do the act of heating. We have shewn how here, in ii. 19, iii. 27 and v. 15 and other places, the Lord has taught that the Self has in Himself no concern with action or with its accessories or with its results, that they are imputed to the Self by avidya, and that they are therefore said to belong to the Self only by a figure of speech. And we shall also explain how the same truth is taught in the sequel.

(Objection):—Well if the Self has in Himself no concern with action or with its accessories or with its results, and if they are ascribed (to the Self) by avidya, then it would follow that the rituals (karmas) are intended only for the ignorant, not for the wise.*

And this is opposed to the sastra which often says that one should perform the sacrificial rituals with knowledge,—(A).

(Answer):—Yes,† it does follow, as we shall explain when commenting on xviii. 11. And in the section (xviii. 50, et seq.) where the teaching of the whole sastra is summed up, we shall dwell more particularly on this point. No need here to expatiate further on the subject; so we conclude for the present.

The Sastra demands from the ritualist the knowledge of the existence of a Self beyond the body, not also the knowledge that that Self is free from all attributes, such as hunger.

Summary of the Doctrine.

Here follows a verse which forms a summary of the teaching of the Discourse on Kṣetra (i.e., thirteenth Discourse), which is already contained in brief in the verses xiii. 1, 2; for it is but proper to give beforehand a summary of the whole doctrine to be explained at length in the sequel.