Chapter 18 - Verse 66

Righteous deeds (dharma); including unrighteous deeds (a-dharma) also, since naishkarmya or freedom from all action is intended to be taught here. Here may be cited such passages of the sruti and the smriti as the following

“Not he who has not abstained from evil deed…can attain It.”—(Katha-Up. 1-2-24).

“Abandon dharma and a-dharma,”

So, the passage means “renouncing all works.” Me alone : the Īśvara, the Self of all, dwelling the same in all. Seek Me as thy sole Refuge : in the belief “I myself am that Īśvara;” ie, do thou understand that there is naught else except Me. When thou art firm in this faith, I shall liberate thee from all sins, from all bonds of dharma and a-dharma, by manifesting Myself as thy own Self. So it has been already said here,

I destroy the darkness born of ignorance by the lumi- nous lamp of wisdom, abiding in their self.—(x. II.) Wherefore do thou not grieve.

What is the means to the Highest Bliss,—Knowledge or Works?

What has been determined in the Gītā-śāstra as the means of attaining the Highest Bliss (nis-sreyasa)? Is it Knowledge (jnana), or Works (karma), or both together?

Whence this doubt?

It has been said “Knowing which one attains the Immortal” (xiii. 12), and “Then knowing Me in truth, he forthwith enters into Me” (xiii. 55): these and other passages teach that the Highest Bliss is attained by mere knowledge. Such passages again as “Thy concern is with action alone” (ii. 47), and “Do thou also perform action,” (iv. 15), teach that performance of works is quite obligatory. Since it has been taught that both knowledge and works are obligatory, there may arise a doubt as to whether also the two conjoined may not constitute the means to the Highest Bliss.

What is the good of this enquiry at all?

It is this, viz., to determine which one of them forms the means to the Highest Bliss. Wherefore, the subject is very wide and is worth investigating.

Self-Knowledge alone is the means to the Highest Bliss.

Pure Self-knowledge alone is the means to the Highest Bliss; for, as removing the notion of variety, it culminates in liberation (kaivalya.) Avidyā is the perception of variety involving actions, factors of action, and the ends of actions. It is always present in the Self. “Mine is action: I am the agent; I do this act for such and such a result:” in this form, avidya has been active in time without a beginning. The remover of this avidya is the knowledge of the Self arising in the following form. “Here I am, free, a non-agent, actionless, devoid of results”; for such a knowledge removes the notion of variety which causes one to engage in action.—The word “alone” (in the opening line of this paragraph) is intended to exclude the two other alternatives: neither by works alone, nor by works and knowledge conjoined together, is the Highest Bliss attained. Since, moreover, the Highest Bliss is not an effect to be accomplished by action, works cannot be the means to it. Indeed, the Eternal Reality is not produced either by knowledge or by works.

(Objection):—Then, even the pure knowledge serves no purpose!

(Answer) :—Not so; for, by removing avidya, it culminates in emancipation, which is a visible result.—We know from experience that knowledge which removes the darkness of avidya culminates in emancipation as its result; for instance, in the case of a rope (mistaken for a serpent), as soon as the light of the lamp removes the darkness which caused the error, the rope is no longer mistaken for a serpent. The result of illumination culminates indeed in the emancipation of the rope, in freeing the rope from the various mistaken notions of serpent, etc., which then cease altogether. So, too, as regards the Self-knowledge.

Knowledge cannot be conjoined with Works.

Now when the agent and other factors of action are operating in the act of cutting or in the act of churning fire,—each act producing a visible result,—they cannot (at the same time) operate in another act productive of another result different from severance or the kindling of a fire; so also when the agent and other factors of action are concerned in the act of knowledge-devotion (jnana-nishtha),—whereof alike the result is visible,—they cannot at the same time operate to bring about another act productive of a result other than the emancipation of the Self. Wherefore, the Devotion of Knowledge cannot be conjoined with works.

(Objection):—They may be conjoined, just as the act of eating and the acts of fire worship (agnihotra), etc., are conjoined.

(Answer):—No; for, emancipation being the result of knowledge, (the devotee of knowledge) cannot desire the result of works.—When there is an all-spreading flood of water close by, nobody would ever think of constructing wells and tanks to any purpose. So also when knowledge leading to emancipation as its result has been attained, nobody would ever desire any other result or seek to do an act by which to obtain that other result. He who is engaged in an act by which he hopes to acquire a whole kingdom will not certainly engage in an act which can at best secure for him a piece of land, nor will he cherish a desire for it. Therefore works are not the means to the Highest Bliss. Neither is a conjunction of knowledge and works possible. Nor can it be held that knowledge which leads to emancipation requires the aid of works; for as removing avidya, knowledge is opposed to works. Indeed, darkness cannot remove darkness. Therefore, knowledge alone is the means to the Highest Bliss.

Refutation of the theory that salvation is attained by works alone.

(Objection):—No. For, by neglect of nitya or obligatory works one incurs sin (pratyavaya); and kaivalya or emancipation is eternal.

(To explain):—It is wrong to say that emancipation is attained by knowledge alone; for by neglect of the nitya-karma or obligatory works enjoined in the sruti, a man incurs sin which leads him to hell, etc.

(Counter-objection):—Thus, then, since moksha is not to be attained by works, there can be no hope of attaining moksha at all.

(Rejoinder):—There is no room for any such objection, inasmuch as moksha is eternal. The sin of omission (pratyavaya) is avoided by the observance of the nitya-karma or obligatory works; by avoiding the prohibited acts, no obnoxious bodies are generated; by avoiding the kamya-karma or interested acts no desirable body either generated; and when the present body perishes on the exhaustion of the fruits of the works which have given rise to the body, no more causes then exist which can generate another body; and when attachment and other passions are expunged from the heart, the emancipation of the Self—i.e., the realisation by the Self of His own true nature—is attained without any effort.

(Connter-objection):—Those of the acts done in the past innumerable births, which have not yet begun their effects, and of which some lead to heaven and others to hell, and so on, have not been extinguished, because their effects have not been enjoyed.

(Rejoinder):— No; for we argue that the fruits of those works are reaped in the form of the trouble and pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma. Or the nitya-karma may, like the prayaschitta or expiatory act, serve to destroy past sins. The works which have begun their effects being exhausted by the enjoyment of their fruits, and no new works being undertaken, it follows that emancipation is attained without any effort.

(Answer):—No; for the sruti says that there exists no other road to moksha than knowledge:

“Knowing Him alone, one crosses beyond death;
there exists no other road to the Abode.” (Svet. Up. 3.8).

Śruti says, further, that moksha is as impossible for the unwise man as it is impossible for men to compress the akasa like leather (Ibid. 6—20). And the Puranic tradition also says that ‘one attains emancipation by knowledge.’

Moreover, the good deeds (punya-karma) which have not yet begun their effects cannot be said to have been exhausted. Just as the existence of sins which have not begun their effects is possible, so also the existence of good (punya) deeds which have not yet begun their effects is possible; and as these cannot be exhausted without generating another body, moksha is not possible.

Neither is it possible to generate no new merit and demerit (dharma and adharma in this body), inasmuch as destruction of love and hatred and delusion which lead to acts of merit and demerit cannot be effected except by means of Self-knowledge. Because the sruti says that the nitya-karma produces merit (punya) as its result, and because the smriti says that, by performing their proper duties, the several castes and orders attain to a high immeasurable happiness, the exhaustion of works is not possible.

Refutation of the theory that the Nitya-Karma leads to no future births.

Now, as to the contention: As painful in itself, the nitya-karma is itself the fruit of sinful deeds committed in the past; apart from itself, the nitya-karma bears no distinct fruit, because the sruti speaks nowhere of its fruits, the mere circumstance of a man being alive forming a sufficient ground for its necessary performance.

We say, no; for, it is impossible for those deeds to yield their fruits which have not yet begun to work out their effects. Neither can there be any variety in the pain (involved in the performance of the nitya-karma).

(To explain) :—It is wrong to say that the fruits of sinful deeds committed in the past births are reaped in the form of the trouble and pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma. We cannot indeed understand how the fruit of the deeds which did not sprout up for fruition at the time of death can be reaped in the birth caused by another set of deeds. Otherwise, there would be nothing unreasonable in the supposition that infernal suffering is possible in the very birth that has been generated by Agnihotra (fire-sacrifice) for the enjoyment of the fruit thereof i. e., for the enjoyment of heaven (svarga).

Moreover, the pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma cannot answer to that variety of suffering (which should result from the variety) of acts of sin. While many acts of sin productive of as many distinct kinds of suffering may possibly exist, to suppose that their effects consist in the mere trouble and pain involved in the observance of the nitya-karma would lead to the further supposition—which it is impossible to hold—that the suffering inflicted by the pairs of opposites, diseases and the like, has no cause of its own, and that the trouble and pain involved in the observance of the nitya-karma is alone the effect of past sins, but not the pain of carrying stones on the head or the like.

Besides, it is irrelevant to say that the trouble and pain involved in the observance of the nitya-karma constitutes the result of the sinful deeds done in the past.—How?—It has been urged that no extinction of the past sin which has not begun to bear fruit is possible; whereas you say that the fruit of the deed which has begun to bear fruit—not the fruit of the deed which has not begun to bear fruit—is reaped in the form of the trouble and pain involved in the observance of the nitya-karma. If, on the other hand, you mean that the whole sin committed in the past has begun to bear fruit, then there is no ground for the specification that the mere trouble and pain involved in the observance of the nitya-karma are the fruits (of those sinful deeds which have not begun to produce their effects). It would then also follow that the enjoining of the nitya-karma has no purpose to serve; for, the sinful deeds which have begun their effects can be extinguished by merely undergoing the effects so produced.

Moreover, if pain be the result of the nitya-karmas en-joined in the sruti that pain may arise from the trouble involved in the observance of the nitya-karma itself as from any other active exercise : it is therefore unreasonable to suppose that it is the result of another action.

Again as enjoined on a man on the mere ground of his being alive, the nitya-karma cannot be, any more than a prayaschitta or expiatory act, the effect of sins committed in the past. An expiatory act, enjoined by a reason of a certain act of sin having been committed, is not the fruit of that sinful act. If, on the other hand, the pain of the expiatory act be the effect of the very sinful act which forms its occasion, then, it would follow that the trouble and pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma occasioned by the man’s being alive, etc., is the effect of that very state of being alive which has occasioned the necessity; the nitya-karma and prayaschitta being alike necessitated by the particular occasions respectively.

Moreover, the trouble and pain involved in the performance of a nitya-agnihotra (fire-worship done as a duty) and a kamya-agnihotra (fire worship done with a motive) being equal, and no special reason being found as to why the trouble and pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma alone should constitute the result of sins committed in the past, but not the tronble and pain involved in the performance of the kâmya-karma, it would follow that the latter also is the result of sins committed in the past. Such being the case, it is wrong to infer, on the ground of consistency (arthâpatti), that because no mention is made in the sruti of the nitya-karma’s results and because the injunction thereof is otherwise inexplicable, the trouble and pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma is the result of sins committed in the past. The injunction being otherwise inexplicable, we should even infer that the nitya-karma is productive of results distinct from the pain and trouble involved in its performance.

The opponent is also guilty of inconsistency. When it is once admitted that through the performance of the nitya-karma the fruit of another deed is reaped, this reaping forms itself the fruit of the nitya-karma, and it is therefore inconsistent to hold at the same time that the nitya-karma produces no fruits of its own.

Moreover, when the kāmya-agnihotra is performed, the nitya-agnihotra is also said to have been performed simultaneously, as included in that self-same act; and therefore the fruit of the kāmya-agnihotra should become exhausted with the trouble and pain involved in the nitya-agnihotra, inasmuch as the kāmya-agnihotra is not a distinct act from the nitya-agnihotra. If, on the other hand, the effect of the kāmya-agnihotra be something distinct, such as svarga, then it would follow that the trouble and pain of its performance must also be distinct; but it is not so, for it is opposed to facts. In point of fact, the trouble and pain involved in the performance of the nitya-karma is not distinct from that of the kāmya-karma.

Furthermore, an action which is neither enjoined nor prohibited (in the sruti) is productive of immediate results; but an act which is enjoined or prohibited by the sastra cannot be productive of immediate result. If this latter were productive of immediate results, then no effort would be made with a view to attain an unseen result, even though it be svarga or the like, so long as it is held that in the case of Agnihotra or the like—despite the absence of all distinction in the nature of the Act—the fruits of the act when performed as a nitya- karma are reaped in the form of the mere trouble and pain involved in its performance, whereas when performed as a kāmya-karma the self-same act produces a superior result—such as svarga—merely because there is a longing for its results, although the latter act is not superior to the former in any of the subsidiary parts in the mode of performance. Wherefore it is in no way reasonable to contend that the nitya-karma does not lead to results in the unseen future.

The Paths of Knowledge and Works are meant for distinct classes of aspirants.

So*, knowledge alone can cause total destruction of good or evil deeds caused by avidya—not the performance of the nitya-karma. For, avidya and kama (nescience and desire) constitute the seed of all action. Accordingly it has been declared that Karma-Yoga pertains to the ignorant and that Jñāna-nistha or knowledge-devotion accompanied with renunciation of all works pertains to the wise. Vide ii. 19, 21 : iii. 3, 26, 28; v. 8, 13; vii. 18; ix. 21, 22; x, 10. From the last verse here quoted it should be inferred that ignorant men who are devoted to action cannot approach the Lord. And therefore, notwithstanding that ignorant men, who are followers of works, are most devout, rendering service to the Lord, they resort only to one of the several paths mentioned xii. 6-11) in their descending order, the lowest of them being that which consists in abandoning the fruits of action. But as regards those who are devoted to the Undefinable and the Indestructible, the attributes they cultivate are mentioned in xii. 13-20; and their path of knowledge is also described in the three discourses commencing with the (thirteenth dis- course on the Kṣetra.* The triple result of action,—such as the evil, good and mixed fruit,—(xviii. 12) does not accrue to those who have renounced all works generated by the five causes such as the body (xviii. 14), who know that the Self is one and non-agent, who are engaged in the higher devotion of knowledge, who have known the true nature of the Lord,—to the Paramahamsa-Parivrajakas (i.e., the samnyasins of the fourth or highest order) who have obtained refuge in the unity of the Self and the Divine Being. But it does accrue to others who are ignorant, who follow the path of works, who are not samnyasins. Thus should we assign the paths of duty taught in the Gītā-śāstra.

Because the nitya-karma, like the kamya-karma, yields its fruits in the invisible future by way of taking the devotee to the regions of Pitris and the like, it is not intended for the removal of sins; and therefore self-knowledge alone, it must be admitted, conduces to the end.—A.

Vide xiii. 7-11, xiv. 22-26, xv. 3-5.—A.

Action is a creature of Avidya

(Objection):—It cannot be proved that all action is caused by avidya.

(Answer):—No; it can be proved, as in the case of brahmanicide (brahmahatya).—The nitya-karma is no doubt taught in the sastra; but it concerns the ignorant alone. Just as the act of brahmanicide, which, is prohibited in the sastra, is known to be a source of evil, is committed only by him who is ignorant and influenced by passion and other evil tendencies,—his concern in it being otherwise inexplicable—so also, all nitya, naimittika, and kamya karmas, i. e., all works comprising the constant and occasional duties as well as all interested sacrificial rites, concern only him who is ignorant (of the Self.)

(Objection) :—So long as it is not known that the Self is distinct from the body, it is not likely that any man would undertake to perform the nitya-karma, etc.

(Answer) :—Not so; for, we see that a man engages in an act thinking “I do” the act, which, being of the nature of motion, is really done by the agency of the not-Self, (of the body, etc.).

(Question) :—The regarding of the aggregate of the body, etc., as the Self is only a gauna-pratyaya or a figuratively expressed notion; it is not an illusion (mithya).

(Answer) :—Not so; for, then its effects, too, must be gauna, must have been figuratively spoken of.

(To explain the objection) :—When we speak of the aggregate of the body, etc.,—which are things belonging to the Self,—as the Self, our words should be understood in a figurative sense, as when for instance, addressing the father the sruti says “thyself art he who is spoken of as thy son.” In common parlance, too, we say “this cow is my very life.” In the present case there is certainly no mithyapratyaya or illusory notion. It is only when the distinction between the two is not perceived,—as when a pillar is mistaken for a man,—that we have an instance of illusion.

(To explain the answer) :—Not so. A gauna-pratyaya cannot lead to a real effect; for, a figurative expression,—the sign of similarity being understood,—is merely intended to extol the subject. For example. such expressions as “Devadatta is a lion” and “the student is fire” are intended merely to extol the subjects, Devadatta and the student, because of their respective resemblance to the lion and fire in point of fierceness and yellowishness; but no effect of the existence of a real lion or of a real fire is accomplished in virtue of that figurative expression or idea. On the other hand, one actually experiences the evil effects of an illusory notion.

Furthermore, one knows what the subject in reality is when it is figuratively spoken of as some other thing : one knows that Devadatta is no lion and that the student is no fire. So also, if the bodily aggregate be figuratively spoken of as the Self, the act done by the bodily aggregate would not be regarded as an act done in reality by the Self, by the real subject of the notion “I.” Indeed, no act done by a gauna (figurative) lion or fire can become an act done by a real lion or fire. Neither is any purpose whatever of an actual lion or fire served by fierceness or yellowishness, it being merely intended to extol (the subject).

Moreover, he who is thus praised knows that he is not a lion, that he is not fire; he never regards an act of a lion or of fire as his. So, (if in the present case the bodily aggregate were figuratively spoken of as the Self), one would think rather that the act of the (bodily) aggregate “is not mine,” i.e., not the real Self’s, than that “I am the agent, mine is the action.”

And as regards the theory that the Self actually does an act,—his memory, desire and effort forming causes of action,—we say that such is not the case, because they proceed from illusion. In fact, memory desire and effort proceed from impressions produced by the experience of desirable and undesirable effects of actions set up by illusion. Just as in this birth dharma and a-dharma and the experience of their fruits are due to the identifying of the Self with the aggregate of the body, etc., to affection and aversion and so on, so also in the last previous birth and in the birth previous to that, and so on. Thus we are to infer that samsara, past and future, is caused by avidya and is without a beginning. Wherefore it follows that the final cessation of samsara is attained through devotion to knowledge accompanied with renunciation of all works.

Because attachment to the body is an aspect of avidya, therefore, when avidya ceases, the body also must cease to be, and then samsara necessarily ceases.—The identifying of the Self with the aggregate of the body, etc., is an aspect of avidya; for, nobody in the world who knows that he is distinct from a cow, &c., and that the cow, &c., are distinct from him, regards them as himself. Only an ignorant man identifies the Self with the aggregate of the body, etc., for want of discrimination, in the same way that one mistakes the branchless trunk of a tree for a man :—but not he who knows the truth by discrimination.

As to the son being spoken of as the father himself in the sruti, “thyself art he who is spoken of as thy son,” it is a gauna-pratyaya, a figuratively expressed notion, because of their relation as the generator and the offspring. By what is only figuratively spoken of as the Self, no real purposes of the true Self can be accomplished, any more than the son can eat for the father. No real purposes, for instance, of a real lion and a real fire can be achieved by what are only figuratively spoken of as a lion and fire.

(Objection) :—Since the scriptural ordinances are of undisputed authority in transcendental matters, the purposes of the Self can certainly be achieved by what are figuratively spoken of as the Self—viz., the body, the senses, and so on.

(Answer) :—No : for, they are selfs set up by avidya. The body and the senses and the like are not figuratively spoken of as the Self. On the other hand, being really not Self, they are regarded as selfs by illusion; for, they are regarded as the Self so long as there is illusion, and they cease to be regarded as the Self when illusion disappears. It is only children, the ignorant people, who, for want of knowledge think, “I am tall, I am yellowish,” and thus regard the aggregate of the body, etc., as the Self. On the other hand those who can discriminate and understand that “I am distinct from the aggregate of the body,” etc., do not identify themselves with the aggregate of the body, etc. This notion of identity is therefore—because it does not exist in the absence of illusion—caused by illusion; and it is not a gauna-pratyaya. It is only when similarity and difference are distinctly seen between two things—as between a lion and Devadatta, or between a student and fire,—that those two things may be figuratively spoken of in word as identical or so regarded in thought, but not when similarity and difference are not perceived. And as regards the appeal made to the authority of sruti, we say that no such appeal should be made, inasmuch as sruti is an authority in transcendental matters, in matters lying beyond the bounds of human knowledge. Śruti is an authority only in matters not perceived by means of ordinary instruments of knowledge, such as pratyaksha or immediate perception;—i.e., it is an authority as to the mutual relation of things as means to ends, but not in matters lying within the range of pratyaksha; indeed, sruti is intended as authority only for knowing what lies beyond the range of human knowledge. Wherefore it is not possible to suppose that the notion of “I” which arises in connection with the aggregate of the body, etc., and which is evidently dueto illusion, is only a figurative idea. A hundred srutis may declare that fire is cold or that it is dark; still they possess no authority in the matter. If sruti should at all declare that fire is cold or that it is dark, we would still suppose that it intends quite a different meaning from the apparent one; for its authority cannot otherwise be maintained : we should in no way attach to sruti a meaning which is opposed to other authorities or to its own declaration.

The theory of Avidya does not militate against the authority of Karma-Kanda.

(Objection) :—As a man does an action only when he is subject to illusion, it would follow that when he ceases to be an agent * the sruti (which treats of works) would prove false.

i.e., on the cessation of avidya.—A.

(Answer) :—No; for, sruti is still true in the matter of Brahma-vidya.

(Objection) :—If the sruti which treats of works should be no authority, the sruti which teaches Brahmavidya, too, can be no authority.

(Answer) :—Not so; for, there can arise no notion that can remove (Brahmavidyā).—The notion that the Self is identical with the aggregate of the body, etc., is removed when the true nature of the Self is known from the sruti which teaches Brahmavidyā; but not so can this knowledge of the true Self be ever removed in any way by anything whatsoever; for, knowledge of the Self is necessarily associated with its result (i.e., the absence of avidya) like the knowledge that fire is hot and luminous.

Our theory, mareover, does not drive us to the conclusion that the sruti teaching works proves useless; for by restraining the first natural activities one by one and thereby gradually inducing fresh and higher activities, it serves to create an aspiration to reach the Innermost Self. Though the means is mithya or illusory, still it is true, because the end is true, as in the case of the arthavadas or explanatory statements subsidiary to a main injunction. And even in ordinary affairs, when we have to induce a child or a lunatic to drink milk or the like, we have to tell him that thereby his hair will grow, and so on,—Or, we may even argue that the sruti treating of works is an authority in itself * under other circumstances (i.e., before the attainment of Self-knowledge), just as pratyaksha or sense-perception caused by attachment to the body is held to be authoritative prior to (the attainment of) Self-knowledge.

Sakhat, directly, i.e., indipendently of Brahmavidya.—A,

Refutation of the theory of the Self’s agency by mere presence.

Another theory runs as follows :—Though not directiy engaged in action, the Self does act by mere presence. This by itself constitutes the real agency of the Self. A king, for instance, though himself not acting, is said to fight when his soldiers fight, in virtue of his mere presence, and he is said to be victorious or defeated. Similarly the commander of an army acts by mere word. And we find that the king and the commander are connected with the results of the act. To take another example: the acts of the ritviks or officiating priests are supposed to belong to the yajamana or sacrificer. So the acts of the body, etc., we may hold, are done by the Self, inasmuch as their results accrue to the Self. To take yet another example : since the loadstone or magnet makes a piece of iron revolve, real agency may rest with what is not actually engaged in an act. And so also in the case of the Self.

(We reply):—It is not right to say so; for it would be tantamount to saying that that which does not act is a karaka or an agent.

(The opponent says):—Yes, karaka or agency may be of various kinds.

(We reply):—No; for we find that the king, etc., (as instanced above) are direct agents also. In the first place, the king may be personally engaged in fighting. He is a direct agent as causing others to fight, as paying them wages, and also as reaping the fruits accruing from success and defeat. The sacrificer, too, is a real agent as offering the main oblation and as giving presents. Wherefore, we should understand that to speak, by courtesy, of a man as an agent when he is not actually engaged, amounts to a figure of speech. If real agency, which consists in one being actually engaged in the act, were not found in the case of such agents as the king and the sacrificer, then we might suppose that even agency by mere presence constitutes real agency, as in the case of a magnet causing a piece of iron to revolve. On the contrary, we do find the king and the sacrificer actually engaged in some acts. Wherefore agency by mere presence is merely a gauna or figurative agency. Such being the case, even the connection with results can only be gauna or unreal. By a gauna or figurative agent no real action is performed. Therefore it is quite unreasonable to say that the activity of the body, etc., makes the actionless Self a real doer and enjoyer.

The theory of Avidya concluded.

But all this becomes explicable when traced to illusion as its case, as in the case of dreams and the juggler’s art (maya). And no agency or enjoyership or any other evil of the sort is experienced in sleep, samadhi and similar states in which there is a break in the continuity of the illusory notions identifying the Self with the body, etc. Wherefore the illusion of samsara is due solely to an illusory notion and is not absolutely real.

Therefore we conclude that Right Knowledge conduces to absolute cessation of samsara.

Qualification for instruction in the Gita Doctrine.

Having concluded the whole doctrine of the Gītā-śāstra in this discourse, and having also briefly and conclusively started the doctrine especially here at the end to impress it the more firmly, the Lord proceeds now to state the rule as to the handing down of the instruction.