सेनयोरुभयोर्मध्ये विषीदन्तमिदं वचः ॥ १० ॥
tamuvāca hṛṣīkeśaḥ prahasanniva bhārata .
senayorubhayormadhye viṣīdantamidaṃ vacaḥ .. 10 ..
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Self-knowledge alone eradicates misery
Now the portion from i. 2 to ii. 9 should be interpreted as showing whence arise those evils of grief, delusion, etc., which in sentient creatures cause the misery of samsara.—To explain : In ii. 4 et seq. Arjuna displayed grief and delusion caused by his attachment for, and the sense of separation from, dominion, the elders, sons, friends, well-wishers, kinsmen, near and remote relations,—all this arising from his notion that “I am theirs and they are mine.” It was when discrimination was overpowered by grief and delusion that Arjuna, who had of himself been engaged in battle as the duty of the warrior caste, abstained from fighting and proposed to lead a mendicant’s life, which was the duty of a different caste*. Accordingly, all creatures whose intelligence is swayed by grief and delusion and other evil influences naturally abandon their proper duties and resort to those which are prohibited. Even if they are engaged in their duties, their conduct in speech, thought and deed is egoistic and is prompted by a longing for reward. In their case, then owing to an accumulation of merit and demerit, of dharma and adharma, the samsâra, which consists in passing through good and bad births, happiness and misery, becomes incessant. Grief and delusion are thus the cause of samsâra. And seeing that their cessation could not be brought about except by Self-knowledge added to renunciation of all works, Lord Vāsudeva wished to teach that knowledge for the benefit of the whole world through Arjuna and began His teaching with ii. 11.
The brahmanas alone are allowed to enter the fourth Asrama of samnyâsa, which consists in the renunciation of all formal religion and worldly possessions.
The doctrine that knowledge should be conjoined with works
Against the foregoing view some* say:—Mokṣa cannot at all be attained by mere A’tmajnâna-nishthâ by mere devotion of Self-knowledge preceded by the renunciation of all works.—By what then?—Absolute freedom can be attained by knowledge conjoined with works, such as the Agnihôtra prescribed in the Śruti and the Smriti. This is the conclusive teaching of the whole Gītā. As supporting this view may be cited—they say—the verses ii. 33, ii. 47, iv. 15, etc. It should not be supposed that the Vedic ritual is sinful because it involves cruelty, etc.†—Why?—For, our Lord says that, since fighting which is the profession of the warrior caste is a proper duty (of the caste), it is not sinful though it involves cruelty to elders, brother’s sons and the like and is therefore very horrible; and He further says that, in the case of a neglect of this duty, “abandoning thy duty and fame thou shalt incur sin.” (ii. 33). This is clearly tantamount to asserting that those rites which are enjoined as life-long duties by the Vedas are sinless though they involve cruelty to animals.
According to A’nandagiri the Vrittikâra is the commentator here referred to. A Vrittikâra’s interpretation of the Brahma-sûtras I. i: 11—19 is also referred to by Sankaracharya in his commentary on that section. It is very probable that one and the same person was the author of the two Vrittis or commentaries. The Vritti on the Gita was evidently very voluminous, inasmuch as Sri Sankaracharya’s bhashya is professedly very short in comparison with it. It is, therefore, not unlikely that the author of the Vritti on the Gita was no other than Bodhayana who is said to have written a voluminous commentary on the Brahma-sûtras, nearly a million slokas in extent, and of which the Sri-bhashya of Sri Ramanujacharya is said to be a mere abstract.
Such as the eating of uchchishta or what remains of the food, of which another has already eaten—(A).
Sankhya and Yoga distinguished
This is (wrong, since the Lord has made a distinction between Jñâna-nishthâ and Karma-nishthâ, between the devotion of knowledge and the devotion of works, as based respectively upon two distinct standpoints—The real nature of the Self as expounded here in ii. 11—30 by the Lord is called Sânkhya and intellectual conviction of the truth produced by a study of that section,—that the Self is no doer, owing to the absence in Him of such changes as birth—forms the Sânkhya standpoint (Sânkhya-buddhi); and the enlightened who hold this view are called Sânkhyas. Yoga consists in the performance—before the rise of the foregoing conviction—of works as a means to moksha, requiring a knowledge of virtue and sin, and presupposing that the Self is distinct from the body and is the doer and the enjoyer. Such conviction forms the Yoga standpoint (Yoga-buddhi), and the performers of works who hold this view are Yogins. Accordingly two distinct standpoints are referred to by the Lord in ii. 39. Of these, He will assign to the Sânkhyas the Jâna-yoga, or devotion to knowledge, based upon the Sāṅkhya standpoint; and so also He will assign to the Yogins the path of Karma-yoga, or devotion to works, based upon the Yoga standpoint (iii. 3). Thus with reference to the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga standpoints two distinct paths have been shown by the Lord, seeing the impossibility of Jñāna and Karma being conjoined in one and the same person simultaneously, the one being based upon the idea of non-agency and unity, and the other on the idea of agency and multiplicity. The distinction made here is also referred to in the Satapatha-Brâhmana.—Having enjoined renunciation of all works in the words, “The brâhmanas who, having no worldly attachments, wish only for this region of the Self, should give up all worldly concerns,” the Brâhmana continues thus in explanation of the said injunction :
“What have we to do with progeny,—we who live in this region, this Self?” (Brihadaranyaka-Upaniṣad, iv. 4, 22).
In the same Brāhmaṇa (ibid, i. 4, 17) we are told that, before marriage and after completing the investigation into the nature of the Dharma and Vedic injunction, the man of the world ‘desired’ to acquire the means of attaining to the three regions (of man, of Pitṛs, and of Devas), namely, a son and the twofold wealth,—the one kind of wealth being called ‘human (manusha),’ consisting of works and leading to the region of Pitṛs, and the other kind of wealth being called ‘godly (daiva),’ consisting in wisdom (vidya, upasana) and leading to the region of Devas. Thus the Vedic rites are intended for him only who has desires and has no knowledge of the Self. The renunciation of these is enjoined on him who seeks only the region of the Self and is free from desire. This assigning of the two paths to two distinct classes of people would be unjustifiable if the Lord had intended a simultaneous conjunction of knowledge and Vedic rites.
Conjunction inconsistent with the sequel
Neither could Arjuna’s question with which the Third Discourse opens be satisfactorily explained (on that theory). How might Arjuna falsely impute to the Lord—as he did in iii. I—that which is alleged (by the opponent) to have been taught before by the Lord and to have not been heard by Arjuna,—namely, the impossibility of both knowledge and works being followed by one and the same person, as well as the superiority of knowledge to works?
Moreover, if conjunction of knowledge and works be intended for all, it must have been intended for Arjuna as well. In that case how might Arjuna ask about only one of the two.
‘Tell me conclusively that which is the better of the two’ (v. 1)?
If a physician has prescribed a mixture composed of both sweet and cooling articles for a man who wishes to reduce bilious heat (in the system), there cannot arise the question ‘which one alone of the two ingredients can alleviate bilious heat’?
Arjuna’s question, it might be alleged on the other side, was due to his not having understood aright the teaching of the Lord. Even then, the reply of the Lord should have been given in accordance with the question and in the following form: “I meant a conjunction of knowledge and works; why are you thus mistaken?” It would not, on the other hand, be proper to answer in the words “A twofold path was taught by Me” (iii. 3),—an answer which is not in accordance with the question and is altogether beside it.
If it be held that knowledge is to be conjoined with such works only as are enjoined in the smriti, even then the assigning of the two paths to two distinct classes of people respectively and other statements in that connection would be equally inexplicable. Moreover, Arjuna’s blame of the Lord as conveyed by his words “why dost Thou command me to do this horrible deed?” (iii. 1) would be inexplicable, since he knew that fighting was enjoined in the smriti as a Kṣatriya’s duty.
It is not, therefore, possible for anybody to show that the Gītā-Śāstra teaches a conjunction of knowledge with any work whatever, enjoined in the sruti or in the smriti.
Some cases of apparent conjunction explained.
Now a person who, having been first engaged in works owing to ignorance and worldly attachment and other evil tendencies, and having since attained purity of mind by sacrificial rites, gifts, austerity, etc., arrives at the knowledge of the grand truth that “all this is one, the Brahman, the Absolute, the non-agent,” may continue performing works in the same manner as before with a view to set an example to the masses, though neither works nor their results attract him any longer. This semblance of active life on his part cannot constitute that course of action with which knowledge is sought to be conjoined as a means of attaining moksha, any more than Lord Vāsudeva’s activity in His disharge of the duty of the military caste can constitute the action that is to be conjoined with His knowledge as a means to moksha, or that conduces to the attainment of any specific end of His; egotism and hope of reward being absent in both alike. He who knows the truth does not think’I act,’ nor does he long for the results.
Or to take another example: suppose a man seeking svarga or other such objects of desire goes through the ceremony of the Agni-âdhana as a preliminary to the performance of sacrificial rites such as the Agnihotra whereby to attain his desire, and then commences the Agnihotra, which has thus become a kamya (interested) rite; and suppose further that the desire vanishes when the sacrifice is half completed, but that the man goes on with it all the same: the Agnihotra can no longer be regarded as an interested rite. Accordingly our Lord says “though doing, he is not tainted,” (v. 7), and “The Self neither acts nor is tainted.” (xiii. 31).
Now as regards the passages, “Do thou also perform action as did the ancients in the olden time” (iv. 15), and “By action alone, indeed, did Janaka and others aim at perfection” (iii. 20), we must distinguish two cases and interpret the passages thus:
First, suppose that Janaka and the rest were engaged in works though they knew the truth. Then, they did so lest people at large might go astray; whereas they were sincerely convinced that ’the senses’—but not the Self—were engaged in the objects (iii. 28). Thus they reached perfection by knowledge alone. Though the stage of renunciation had been reached, they attained perfection without abandoning works; that is to say, they did not formally renounce works.
Secondly, suppose that they had not known the truth. Then the passages should be interpreted thus;—By means of work dedicated to Īśvara, Janaka and the rest attained perfection,—‘perfection’ meaning here either ‘purity of mind’ or ‘the dawn of true knowledge.’ It is to this doctrine, that the Lord refers when he says “The Yogin performs action for the purification of the self.” (v. 11) Elsewhere, after having said that ‘man attains perfection by worshipping Him with his own duty’ (xviii. 46), the Lord again recommends the path of knowledge, to him who has attained perfection, in the following words: “How he who has attained perfection reaches Brahman, that do thou learn from Me.” (xviii. 50).
The conclusion, therefore, of the Bhagavad-gita is that salvation is attained by knowledge alone, not by knowledge conjoined with works. That such is the teaching of the Gītā. we shall shew here and there in the following sections according to the context.
The Self is immortal.
Now finding no means other than Self-knowledge for the deliverance of Arjuna who was thus confounded as to his duty and was deeply plunged in the mighty ocean of grief, Lord Vāsudeva who wished to help him out of it introduced him to Self-knowledge in the following words :—