कथं स पुरुषः पार्थ कं घातयति हन्ति कम् ॥ २१ ॥
vedāvināśinaṃ nityaṃ ya etamajamavyayam .
kathaṃ sa puruṣaḥ pārtha kaṃ ghātayati hanti kam .. 21 ..
Read the commentary
He who knows the Self (described in the last verse) as indestructible, i.e., devoid of the final change called death, as eternal, i.e., devoid of change called transformation, as unborn and inexhaustible, i.e., devoid of birth and decline,—how does an enlightened man of this description do the act of slaying, or how does he cause another to slay? He slays nobody at all, nor does he at all cause another to slay.—In both the places, denial is meant, since no question can have been asked.* The reason ‡ for the denial of slaying applying to all actions alike, what the Lord means to teach in this section appears to be the denial of all action whatsoever in the case of the enlightened; the denial, however, of the specific act of slaying being only meant as an example.
Because no reply follows.
Viz., the immutability of the Self.
(Objection) :—What special reason for the absence of action in the case of an enlightened man does the Lord see when denying actions in the words “how does such a man slay?”
(Answer) :—The immutability of the Self has already been given as the reason for the absence of all actions.
(Objection):—True, it has been given; but that cannot be a sufficient reason, since the enlightened man is distinct from the immutable Self. We cannot indeed say that a man who has known an immovable pillar can have no action to do.
(Answer):—This objection does not apply. For, the enlightened man is identical with the Self. Enlightenment (vidvatta) does not pertain to the aggregate of the body, etc. Therefore, as the only other alternative, the enlightened man should be identical with the Self, who is not included in the aggregate and is immutable. No action being possible in the case of an enlightened man, it is but just to deny all action in the words “how does such a man slay?” Now, for instance, the Self, while remaining immutable, is, by reason of His not being distinguished from intellectual states (buddhivrittis), imagined, through ignorance, to be the percipient of objects, such as sound, perceived by the intellect and other means. Similarly, the Self is imagined to be enlightened, merely because of avidya associating Him with that intellectual perception—which is unreal—which takes the form of discrimination between the Self and the not-Self, while in reality the Self has undergone no change whatever. From this assertion of impossibility of action in the case of an enlightened man, the conclusion of the Lord is evident, that those acts which are enjoined by the scripture are intended for the unenlightened.
Works are meant for the unenlightened.
(Objection):—Even knowledge is intended for the unenlightened only, as it would be useless—like grinding the flour over again—to impart knowledge to those who already possess it. Wherefore, it is hard to explain the distinction that works are meant for the unenlightened, and not for the enlightened.
(Answer) :—This objection does not apply. For, the distinction can be explained by the existence or non-existence of something to be performed in the two cases respectively. (To explain) : There remains something for the unenlightened man to do, on understanding the meaning of the injunctions regarding the Agnihotra etc. He thinks that the Agnihotra and other sacrificial rites are to be performed, and that the many necessary accessories thereto should be acquired. He thinks further, “I am the agent, this is my duty.” Nothing, on the contrary, remains to be performed subsequent to the realization of the truth of such teachings as are contained in ii. 20 etc., regarding the real nature of the Self. No other conviction arises except that the Self is one and non-agent. Wherefore, the distinction referred to can be accounted for.
In the case of him who thinks that the Self is the doer of actions, there will necessarily arise the idea that he has this or that thing to do. A man who possesses this sort of knowledge is qualified for actions, and on him actions are enjoined. Such a man is unenlightened, for it is said that “both these know not aright” (ii. 19). In ii. 21, the enlightened man is specified, and with reference to him actions are denied in the words “how does such a man slay?” Therefore the enlightened man who has seen the immutable Self and the man who is eager for emancipation have only to renounce all works.* Hence it is that Lord Nārāyaṇa distinguishes the enlightened Sāṅkhyas from the unenlightened followers of works, and teaches to them respectively two distinct paths (iii. 3). Accordingly Vyāsa said to his son, “Now there are two paths.” (Mokṣadharma, xxiv. 6). In the same connection, Vyāsa said that the path of works is the first, and that renunciation comes next. Our Lord will refer to this distinction again and again in this work. (vide iii. 27, 28; v. 13, etc.)
The latter, i.e., he who is eager for Moksha, but who does not yet possess Self-knowledge, has no doubt to perform the acts enjoined on him, these acts being not prejudicial to his devotion to knowledge.
Knowledge of the Immutable Self is possible.
(Objection):—In this connection some conceited pedants say : To no man can arise the conviction ‘I am the immutable Self, the One, the non-agent, devoid of the six changes, such as birth, to which all things in the world are subject;’ which conviction arising, renunciation of all works is enjoined.
(Answer) :—This objection does not apply here. For, in vain then would be the Scriptural teaching, such as “the Self is not born,” etc. (ii. 20). They (the objectors) may be asked why knowledge of the immutablity, non-agency, unity, etc., of the Self cannot be produced by the Scripture in the same way as knowledge of the existence of dharma and a-dharma and of the doer passing through other births is produced by the teaching of the Scripture?
(Opponent) :—Because the Self is inaccessible to any of the senses.
(Answer) :—Not so. For, the Scripture says “It can be seen by the mind alone.” (Bri. Up. iv. 19). The mind, refined by Sama and Dama—i.e., by the subjugation of the body, the mind and the senses—and equipped with the teachings of the Scripture and the teacher, constitutes the sense by which the Self may be seen. Thus, while the Scripture and inference * (anumana) teach the immutability of the Self, it is mere temerity to hold that no such knowledge can arise.
The inference may be thus stated : such changes as birth, death, agency and the like are not inherent in the Self, any more than infancy, youth and old age are inherent in Him.
The enlightened should resort to Jnana-Yoga.
It must be granted that the knowledge which thus arises necessarily dispels ignorance, its opposite. This ignorance has been already indicated in ii. 19. It is there taught that the notion that the Self is the agent or the object of the action of slaying is a product of ignorance. That the agency, etc., of the self is a product of ignorance holds good in the case of all actions alike, since the Self is immutable. It is only the agent, subject to variations of conditions, that causes another person, who can be acted on by him, to do an action. This agency—direct and causative with respect to all actions alike—the Lord Vāsudeva denies in ii. 21 in the case of an enlightened man, with a view to show that the enlightened man has nothing to do with any action whatsoever.
(Question) :—What, then, has he to do?
(Answer) :—This has been already answered in iii. 3, that the Sāṅkhyas should resort to Jnāna-Yoga or devotion to knowledge. So also, the Lord will teach renunciation of all works in the words, “Renouncing all actions by thought, the self-controlled man rests happily in the nine-gated city,—in the body—neither acting nor causing to act.” (v. 13).
(Objection) :—Here the word ‘thought’ implies that there is no renunciation of the acts of speech and body.
(Answer) :—No, for there is the qualification, ‘all actions.’
(Objection) :—The renunciation of all mental acts only is meant.
(Answer) :—No. Since all acts of speech and body are preceded by mental activity, they cannot exist when the mind is inactive.
(Objection):—Then, let him renounce all other acts of mind except such as are necessary for those acts of speech and body which are enjoined by the Scripture.
(Answer):—No, for, there is the qualification, “neither acting nor causing to act.”
(Objection):—Then, the renunciation of all actions, here taught by the Lord, may be meant for the dying man, not for the living man.
(Answer):—No; for then, the qualification ‘rests in the nine-gated city—in the body’ would have no meaning. No man who is dying can by giving up all activity be said to rest in the body.
(Objection):—Let us then construe the passage thus: Neither acting nor causing another to act, he, the disembodied soul of the enlightened man, deposits (sam+nyas) all activity in the body (i. e., knows that all activity belongs to the body, not to the Self) and rests happily. Let us not, on the contrary, construe, as you have done, ‘he rests in the body,’ etc.
(Answer):—No; Everywhere (in the sruti and in the smriti) it is emphatically asserted that the Self is immutable.* Moreover, the act of resting presupposes a place to rest in, whereas the act of renunciation does not presuppose it. And the Sanskrit verb sam+nyas’ means ‘to renounce,’ not ‘to deposit.’
Wherefore the Self cannot be the agent of an action.
Therefore, the Gîtâ-Sâstra teaches that he who has acquired a knowledge of the Self should resort to renunciation only, not toworks. This we shall show here and there in the following sections, wherever they treat of the Self.
How the Self is immutable.
To return to the immediate subject. It has been stated that the Self is indestructible. Like what is He indestructible? Here follows the answer :